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I outline five issues in philosophy of colour that deserve greater attention and provide skeletal 
frameworks for how future work on these topics could be carried out. The issues are: colour and 
metaphilosophy (§1), colour and artistic practice (§2), colour and virtual/augmented reality (§3), 
colour and imagination (§4), and colour and the predictive mind (§5). Some of these issues have 
been a focus of important recent works. Thus, colour conjoined with each of metaphilosophy, 
artistic practice and imagination have all been examined in at least a few recent publications – 
see below for references. It is clear, however, that these recent works are signals that there is 
much still to be done. By contrast, while at present there is a great deal of interest in the 
predictive mind, the intersection of colour and the predictive mind is vastly underexplored. This 
is despite the fact that the philosophy and science of colour are rather developed disciplines. 
Finally, while there have been some very important recent works on virtual and augmented 
reality, the significance of colour for these studies has yet to be examined. It is my hope that after 
reading this article readers are convinced not only that the philosophy of colour has a rich, recent 
history, but also a very bright future. 
 
Keywords: philosophy of colour; metaphilosophy; philosophy of art; virtual reality; philosophy 
of perception; imagination; augmented reality; predictive coding 
 
		
	
Itinera, N. 19, 2020 
	
	
	
11	
The steady pace of philosophy of colour 
 
Derek H. Brown  
(Centre for the Study of Perceptual Experience, Philosophy, University of Glasgow) 
derek.brown.2@glasgow.ac.uk 
 
 
Let me begin by thanking Alice Barale for this wonderful opportunity to help celebrate 
colour and also the launch of The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Colour, edited 
by myself and Fiona Macpherson (hereafter Handbook). This Handbook is in many ways 
an attempt to illustrate how much philosophy can be (and has been) done by considering 
the nature of colour and colour experience, with the aim of stimulating further research into 
the topic. The opening section is a collection of broad philosophical topics – such as the 
mind-body problem, skepticism, philosophy of science, and vagueness – that can be 
examined using colour as a case study. The Handbook then outlines some of the insights 
into the nature of colour and colour perception gleaned from colour science, and proceeds 
to dig rather deeply into some of the issues that arise when trying to figure out what and 
where colours are (colour ontology), how we should understand colour experience, the 
nature of various colour phenomena, and the relation between thought, language and 
colour. Since Barale has provided an overview of the Handbook, I will focus on something 
slightly different. 
In what follows I will sketch a few trends I see or wish to see in philosophy of colour. 
This is not to say that these are the only trends or that other topics don’t deserve further 
examination. Far from it. For example, the strong relation between the science and 
philosophy of colour clearly deserves further exploration, and I expect that will occur in the 
future. Similarly, the importance of colour ontology to the philosophy of colour and of 
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colour to the mind-body problem are rich topics that will continue to attract attention. 
However, some other issues are less visible, but also important, particularly in our current 
climate. Of these, I will examine: colour and metaphilosophy (§1), colour and artistic 
practice (§2), colour and virtual/augmented reality (§3), colour and imagination (§4), and 
colour and the predictive mind (§5). Let’s get started. 
 
1. Colour and Metaphilosophy 
It is worth highlighting some underexplored issues in colour and metaphilosophy. 
Metaphilosophy, roughly the philosophy of philosophy, is a broad topic. I focus on issues 
in metaphilosophy and colour within the analytic tradition. Analytic philosophy is driven 
by formal methods of logical reasoning and in many instances input from empirical 
sciences. Philosophy of colour is no exception to this. In the current climate there is an 
intense focus on topics like the analytic metaphysics of colour and the interpretation of 
empirical data from the science of colour. While I wouldn’t advocate moving away from 
these topics, within analytic philosophy there are worthwhile instances in which the broadly 
“scientific naturalist” methods typical of analytic philosophy are being questioned.  
In philosophy of colour it is standard to examine colour speech and thought, colour 
visual systems, the causal interactions between light, objects and retinas that give rise to 
colour perceptual states, and to do so in a way that leaves room for debate about basic 
questions like Are cucumbers really green? and Do we ever veridically perceive colours in 
our environment?. One motive for leaving such questions open to debate might be respect 
for scepticism, but another (related) motive is a felt need to justify one’s answer in a way 
that will be informative to, if not convince, one’s opponents. 
Like some others, Joshua Gert1 and Keith Allen2 are colour realists, believing for 
example that cucumbers are green and that we often veridically perceive colours. They are 
also colour primitivists, maintaining that colours are sui generis properties (i.e. not 
reducible to basic physical properties like light reflectances). They offer many reasons to 
																																								 																				 	
1 J. Gert, Primitive Colors: A Case Study in Neo-Pragmatist Metaphysics and Philosophy of Perception, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2017. 
2 K. Allen, A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016. 
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accept these claims. One of these – the one I will highlight – is their respective 
metaphilosophical views. These views independently lead them to viewing the truth of 
claims such as “cucumbers are green” as a kind of conceptual bedrock that doesn’t stand in 
need of sustained justification. In the briefest of terms, and overlooking many fine points, 
here is the rough idea.  
Gert’s colour realism stems in part from his commitment to neopragmatism 3 . 
Neopragmatists 4  typically endorse minimalist or deflationary accounts of truth and 
reference. Thus, the question Are there colours? isn’t about whether “blue”, “yellow” and 
so on refer to genuine properties in our world. Instead, on their proposal the question is 
about whether basic colour sentences, sentences like “cucumbers are green” and “carrots 
are orange”, receive widespread communal acceptance, can be ostensively taught, and can 
be incorrectly asserted (e.g. in odd circumstances or by persons with deficits in colour 
vision). Since basic colour sentences arguably do have these features, colours are real. By 
contrast, according to what Gert calls «scientific naturalism»5, it is one thing to recognize 
the communal agreement about the contextually-stable use of basic colour sentences, but 
quite another to justify the reality of colours6.  
Allen labels his metaphilosophical view «transcendental naïve realism»7. Intuitively, 
naïve realism about perception is the thesis that we can and typically do directly or 
immediately perceive the reality around us. In philosophy it is often characterized as a 
claim about perceptual experience, namely that perceptual experiences are relations 
between perceivers and the mind-independent objects that are being experienced. Crucially, 
the mind-independent objects are not merely represented by perceptual experiential states, 
they partly constitute these states. The transcendental naïve realist sees naïve realism as a 
																																								 																				 	
3 See e.g. J. Gert, Primitive Colors, cit., chap. 2. 
4  See e.g. H. Price, Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge Ma. 2013.	
5 J. Gert, Primitive Colors, cit., p. 68. 
6 For discussion see D. Brown, Review of J. Gert, “Primitive Colors”, in “Philosophical Review”, 128(3), 
2019, pp. 348–352.  
7 K. Allen, The Value of Perception, in “Philosophy and Phenomenological Research”, 18 January 2019, doi: 
10.1111/phpr.12574. See also K. Allen, A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour, cit., esp. chpt. 8, where the 
connection to colour is explicit, though Allen’s metaphilosophy isn’t quite as developed as in The Value of 
Perception. 
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kind of bedrock thesis, not in need of «external “rational” justification»8. It is instead a 
«core element of our conceptual scheme», something in need of illumination – but not 
doubting – through philosophical study9. Thus, the prescription is not a critique of naïve 
realism, but a Kantian-styled transcendental analysis, an attempt to explain the conditions 
for the possibility of naïve realism. While one can be a naïve realist about visual perception 
and reject the objectivity and reality of colour, it is difficult to do so. Thus, relatedly, part of 
Allen’s motive for his colour primitivism is his transcendental naïve realism. 
My point is not to suggest that we should endorse (or reject) these arguments. My point 
is that in both cases metaphilosophical commitments – commitments about how philosophy 
should be done, about what kinds of philosophical questions stand in need of further 
justification – are at least partly motivating their projects. With this in hand, let me make 
two comments.  
First, it is somewhat easier to now see that different metaphilosophical commitments, 
those akin to some kind of “scientific naturalism”, are often presumed in much 
contemporary philosophy of colour. Thus, the truth of “cucumbers are green” is not 
conceptual bedrock for many philosophers of colour. This is in part because they believe in 
a more substantive notion of reference and truth than the neopragmatist. It is also in part 
because they believe that external rational justification of colour primitivism (and naïve 
realism) can and should be sought, thus reducing the weight of transcendental arguments 
offered in support of these views. 
Second, to my knowledge, a map about how these and other metaphilosophical 
commitments can inform and be informed by philosophy of colour hasn’t been charted. Nor 
has there been a substantive debate about these issues. Given the magnitude of what’s in 
play, a map and debate seems worthwhile. 
 
2. Artistic practice and colour 
It is well known that colour has been studied not only in vision science but also in cultural 
studies, history, literature, visual art, architecture, fashion, and so on. Yet the influence of 
																																								 																				 	
8 K. Allen, The Value of Perception, cit., p. 7. 
9 Ibidem.	
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the science of colour on contemporary philosophy of colour far outweighs not only the 
influence of these other fields, but arguably the sum of those influences. Consider visual art 
as an example. Although philosophers of art routinely discuss works where colour plays a 
prominent role, few philosophers of art explicitly theorize about colour and colour 
perception10, and few philosophers of colour use visual art as a focus of study. Setting aside 
philosophy of art, artistic practice itself is even less studied by philosophers of colour. Yet 
it is well-known that practical work of this sort yields numerous insights in the topics they 
study. One fascinating example of artistic colour practice yielding philosophical insight has 
recently been discovered. Given Intinera’s interest in aesthetics, it is worthwhile 
introducing readers to it.11 
The philosophy and science of colour routinely assumes the opponent process theory of 
colour.12 The rough idea is as follows. Normal human trichromats have three cones, with 
peak sensitivities to the long, medium and short wavelength ranges of the visible spectrum, 
yielding L, M and S cones, respectively. According to this theory, human colour vision is 
further structured by the colour opponent system, which receives information from these 
cones and processes their differences in an antagonistic manner. The opponent system 
contains two chromatic opponent channels (red-green and blue-yellow) and an achromatic 
opponent channel (white-black). Set aside the achromatic channel. The red-green channel 
receives information from the L and M cones, and calculates the function L – M. If the 
result is positive, then the channel outputs red, if it’s negative it outputs green, and if the 
value is null the channel doesn’t output anything. The antagonism or opponency is the fact 
that triggering green entails supressing red and vice versa. There is no option of triggering 
both red and green. The blue-yellow channel receives information from all three cones and 
																																								 																				 	
10 One exception is D. M. Lopes, Pictorial Color: Aesthetics and Cognitive Science, in “Philosophical 
Psychology”, 12(4), pp. 415-28.  
11 This example is described in F. Macpherson,	 Novel Colour Experiences and their Implications, in D. 
Brown, F. Macpherson, The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, Routledge, London 2020, chpt. 
11. Macpherson was made aware of it by M. Newhall, Painting With Impossible Colours, slides of a talk 
delivered at the “Depiction, Pictorial Experience, and Vision Science” conference, Centre for the Study of 
Perceptual Experience, University of Glasgow, 15 – 17 November 2018 (unpublished). 
12 The opponent process theory was first proposed by E. Hering, Outlines of a Theory of the Light Sense 
(1892), Harvard University Press, Cambridge Ma. 1964. Key psychophysical data in support was added by L. 
Hurvich, D. Jameson, An opponent-process theory of color vision, in “Psychological Review” 64, 6, Part I, 
pp. 384–404, and various developments (including neuro-biological evidence) have been added since. 
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calculates S – (L + M). If the result is positive the channel outputs blue, and if negative it 
outputs green. On this model, human colour visual systems cannot enter into a state that 
represents both blue and yellow (at the same location at the same time), or a state that 
represents both green and red (at the same location at the same time). In short, according to 
opponent theory we cannot visually represent or experience bluish-yellows or reddish-
greens. 
In recent years, scientists have seemingly been able to “trick” our visual systems to enter 
into such “impossible” states13, providing evidence against the opponent theory of colour. 
These experiments often use eye-trackers and carefully crafted stimuli, and, crucially, some 
subjects report experiencing colours that are reddish-green. The kinds of experiences 
induced in subjects are unfamiliar or novel to subjects, and as such are not easy to 
reproduce outside the highly contrived experimental situations. This makes the application 
of these cases to everyday colour vision somewhat limited.  
Interestingly, visual artists have also addressed the opponency issue, but the method and 
result are different. The evening sky generates numerous colours, and at times the blue of 
the sky or of the sea can be found alongside the yellow of the setting sun, yet the 
boundaries between these blues and yellows needn’t appear sharp. In that case, one might 
wonder whether the boundary area contains or looks to contain a bluish-yellow colour (i.e. 
a mixture of blue and yellow). According to the opponent process theory of colour, the area 
cannot look to be bluish-yellow, because nothing can look this way. From the painter’s 
perspective, the central question is the practical one: Can I paint a smooth transition from 
blue to yellow without going through any other colour, including white or grey? The 
answer is that you can paint something that looks like a smooth transition from blue to 
yellow that doesn’t go through any other colour14. Hence one way to describe the transition 
area is as looking bluish-yellow, in conflict with the opponent process theory of colour. The 
paints used to achieve this include a combination of blues, some warm colours like yellows 
																																								 																				 	
13 See e.g. H. Crane, T. Piantanida, On Seeing Reddish Green and Yellowish Blue, in “Science”, 221(4615), 
pp. 1078-1080. 
14 See e.g. S. Ryan, How to Paint a Sky - Acrylic Painting Lesson, YouTube Video, published on Aug 17, 
2013, accessed 19 November 2018. 
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and reds, and a white. The actual colours of the final canvass at each region are open to a 
few different descriptions. On one of these descriptions, the canvass has a blue region, a 
yellow region, and a grey region in between the two. If this is accurate, then the canvass 
itself doesn’t have a bluish-yellow region, even though it arguably looks to. Thus, while 
there are some questions about how best to describe the experienced colours of the canvass, 
and how best to describe the colours of the canvass, we have a purported counterexample to 
the opponent process theory of colour deriving from artistic practice (not science).  
This demonstrates that challenges to colour theory do derive from artistic practice. 
Perhaps more importantly, this counterexample derives from natural scenes and is readily 
appreciable by the public. By contrast, the examples from the scientific experiments are, as 
mentioned, not viewable outside laboratory settings, and their character is difficult for 
subjects to communicate to experimenters. Thus, although the character of both the colour 
experiences had during the scientific experiments and the colour experiences of the canvass 
are difficult to describe, the public observability of the canvass allows for an important kind 
of public scrutiny and debate about the applicability of various descriptions that the 
scientific case doesn’t readily support. In at least this regard the artistic counterexample is 
of heightened philosophical interest.  
I don’t mean to suggest that the purportedly bluish-yellow looking regions of paintings 
of sunsets demonstrate beyond doubt that the opponent process theory of colour is 
mistaken. I instead suggest that the case has special value because of its derivation from 
natural scenes and accessibility for public scrutiny. Given how little attention philosophers 
of colour typically pay to artistic practice, it is hard to say how many insights into 
philosophy of colour might be lying in wait. 
 
3. Colour and virtual/augmented reality  
Virtual reality is upon us, and it has many philosophically striking aspects. It brings the 
possibility of a “full visual illusion”, and (relatedly) prompts difficult questions about 
perceptual ontology and perceptual experience. Virtual reality yields ethical questions, such 
as whether or not and to what extent people should prefer actual reality to virtual reality. 
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Since, in its current form, virtual reality is predominantly visual, and colour is central to 
visual experience, colour is immediately at the heart of these issues. Similar issues arise 
from augmented reality, where virtual elements are “layered on top of” or “inserted into” 
perceived objective reality. Let me make a few remarks about how colour might figure into 
the emerging research on these topics 
There are obvious perceptual and ontological analogy between virtual reality and 
representational works of art. Thus, the colours and shapes presented on the screen of the 
virtual reality headset are analogues of the colours and shapes presented on the canvass of a 
painting. These presented features serve to represent, via depiction, objects and features in 
the depicted scene or world.  
Ontologically, how should we understand the reality of the depicted scenes? In the 
theory of depiction, realists maintain that the depicted scenes are real or exist in a 
substantive sense, and various proposals try to limit this sense of “reality”, including by 
appeal to universals, ideas, and fictional worlds15. In theory, all options are applicable to 
virtual reality, although debates about these applications are in their infancy (e.g. Chalmers 
defends a kind of realism, and McDonnell and Wildman defend fictionalism)16. While 
colour may not yield any specific insights here, it is an interesting case study regardless. 
Colour’s significance to the relevant perceptual issues is more pronounced. 
How should we understand the perceptual and experiential states that arise from 
engaging with depictive artworks? Many answers have been proposed. Perhaps such 
perceptions involve a persistent kind illusion, a view often attributed to Gombrich17. 
Perhaps there is a twofoldness or «seeing-in» to these states, where we in some sense 
perceive both the presented features on the canvass or virtual reality headset, and depicted 
																																								 																				 	
15  For an overview see e.g. J. Hyman, K. Bantinaki, Depiction, in E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition) 
(https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/depiction/). 
16  See D. Chalmers, The virtual and the real, in “Disputatio”, 9(46), 2017, pp. 309–52 (doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0009); N. McDonnell, N. Wildman, Virtual reality: digital or fictional?, in 
“Disputatio”, 11 (55), 2019 (doi: 10.2478/disp-2019-0004). 
17 E. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation, Phaidon, London 
1960. 
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scenes18. A more recent proposal is that the perceptual states typically involved in picture 
perception are of the same psychological kind as those involved in everyday «face-to-face» 
perception, except that during picture perceptions we engage «virtual models» of objects 
and scenes in pictorial space19.  
Again, in theory these and other options from the theory of depiction are applicable to 
virtual reality, although debates about these applications have barely begun. Colour is a 
particularly important case study, because the presented features on the canvass or virtual 
reality headset typically include real colours that are interacting with our visual systems. 
By contrast the canvass or screen doesn’t have real analogues of the depicted objects (e.g. 
real dogs or goblins), and the 2D shapes on the canvass or screen bear a thorny relationship 
to the 3D shapes of the depicted objects. Thus, if perceptions of depictive art and virtual 
reality are twofold, or illusory, or involve engaging “virtual” objects and their colours, the 
role that the presented real colours play is of particular interest20.  
An important disanalogy between depiction in art versus virtual reality is that, when 
wearing a virtual reality headset, the screen is arguably impossible to perceive as a screen 
in the way that canvasses are typically perceivable as canvasses. In this regard perhaps the 
default perceptual state in virtual reality is more akin to the kind of state that occurs when 
viewing tromp l’oeil works (i.e. paintings that bound toward looking like a real scene as 
opposed to a painting of a scene). Tromp l’oeil paintings are an infamous trouble case for 
theories of depiction, and not the kind of case depiction theorists typically build their 
theories around. These factors arguably make the real colours of the virtual reality screen 
even more difficult to accommodate in one’s theory of perception and experience in virtual 
reality.  
Recall that augmented reality is where images are layered in front of or inserted into the 
scene before one, for example arising when one wears transparent glasses that selectively 
																																								 																				 	
18 See R. Wollheim, Art and Illusion, in “British Journal of Aesthetics”, 3(1), pp. 15–37; Id., Painting as an 
Art, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1987. 
19 R. Briscoe, Depiction, Pictorial Experience, and Vision Science, in “Philosophical Topics”, 44(2), 2016, 
pp. 43-81. 
20 J. Kulvicki, Colour and the arts: Chromatic perspectives, in D. Brown, F. Macpherson, The Routledge 
Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, cit., chpt. 6. 
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produce images on the lenses. While it is tempting to use the above options and simply 
apply them to augmented reality perceptions, it would be a mistake to begin this way. In 
depiction cases, the canvass or virtual reality screen essentially function to depict the 
represented scene. By contrast, while the virtual images of augmented reality may at times 
depict the reality “beyond” them, in many instances they may not. Consider some 
examples.  
Suppose first that one’s augmented reality glasses do something rather sophisticated like 
identify human faces in the scene before you and make them appear blue, for example by 
producing blue patches on the portion of the glasses that overlap with observed faces. It is 
reasonable to argue that in this case the blue patches on the glasses depict the colours of 
faces in the scene. The depictions are in general erroneous, as few if any of the observed 
faces are (by hypothesis) blue. But, for contrast there is a much stronger case to be made 
for depiction in the “blue face” example than in comparison with a scenario in which one 
merely wears blue-tinted glasses. The blue of blue-tinted glasses doesn’t function as a 
depiction of any observed scene in any substantive sense. An intermediate case might be 
one in which one’s augmented reality glasses introduce a blue tint to the scene in response 
to specific general environmental conditions, such as extreme brightness. I suspect in this 
case the blue in some important senses is depicting the scene, and in other important senses 
isn’t, though space prevents me from fleshing this out. Next, consider a case in which 
augmented reality glasses provide textual information about the face one is standing in 
front of, perhaps a name or occupation. Although that text expresses content that is about 
the face (or about the individual to whom the face belongs), and in this regard represents 
the face (or individual), the information isn’t in any way depicting the face (or individual). 
Finally, suppose the glasses provide textual information about something other than the 
observed scene, perhaps information about oneself, or a new email, or breaking news in 
sport. That text, even though it has representational content, doesn’t represent anything in 
the observed scene (unless by chance).  
Thus, starting with a depiction framework for understanding augmented reality 
perceptions is oversimplified and misleading. Another option is to start with perceptions 
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involving distinct layers where the virtual “proximal” layer isn’t essentially functioning as a 
depiction of the “distal” layer. Colour perception is a crucial case study here as well, for 
this starting point yields numerous possible kinds of visual experiences, many of which will 
have application in augmented reality21. 
 
4. Colour, perception and imagination 
It is clear that we can and often do perceptually experience colours, and that these are 
somehow different from merely imagined colours. How should we understand the 
difference between them? In what ways do the two interact? Recent work on interrelations 
between cognition, imagination and perception challenge influential answers to these 
questions. Here is a brief overview22. 
Imagined colours might be described as less vivid than perceptually experienced ones 
(following Hume), or as more deliberately produced or more liable to fade away without 
sustained effort. All of these criteria are instructive, but also fallible. For example, to 
someone imagining a monster in the closet, the imagined monster might seem extremely 
vivid (e.g. prompting them to run from the room in terror), non-deliberate (e.g. they don’t 
believe it’s their doing, and seemingly can’t make it stop), and persistent (e.g. the imagined 
creature might be present every night for months). Conversely, perceptual experiences can 
lack vivacity (e.g. viewing something in poor lighting), can seem deliberate (e.g. when an 
object in a crowded field is only discernible with considerable effort) and can fade rapidly 
(e.g. fixed, persistent stimuli fade from view very quickly23. Thus, enforcing these kinds of 
criteria to distinguish between perceptions and imaginings is wrong-headed. A more 
nuanced approach is required. 
																																								 																				 	
21 D. Brown, Colour constancy and colour layering, in “Philosophers’ Imprint”, 14(16), 2014, pp. 1-31. 
22 For details see e.g. D. Brown, Infusing perception with imagination, in F. Macpherson, F. Dorsch 
(eds.), Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2018, pp. 
133-160; Id., Infusing perception with imagination?, on The Junkyard: A Scholarly Blog Devoted to 
the Study of the Imagination, 19 February 2020 
(https://junkyardofthemind.com/blog/2020/2/14/infusing-perception-with-imagination). See also D. 
Stokes, Cognitive penetration and the perceptual of colour, in D. Brown, F. Macpherson, The 
Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, chpt. 29, and the references therein. 
23 There are different forms of “perceptual fading”. Illusions like the Troxler effect provide a 
striking illustration of one of them (see e.g. https://www.illusionsindex.org/i/troxler-effect). 
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Setting aside demarcation difficulties, one might ask whether and to what extent 
perceived and imagined colours can mix or overlap in a single state? There is a body of 
research pertaining to “memory colour” which provides surprising insights into the issue. 
The data are controversial, but for purposes of illustration take them at face value. Memory 
colour effects occur roughly when the experienced colour (e.g. the saturation) of a 
perceived thing is affected by background beliefs, for example experiencing a Coke can to 
be more red than a similarly coloured red cube, and, in Scotland, experiencing an Irn Bru 
can as more orange than a similarly coloured orange cube. Why or how does an Irn Bru can 
look more orange than the cube? It seems that perception alone can’t explain the effects, 
because (by design) an Irn Bru can isn’t more orange than the cube. Belief seems 
inadequate as well. Although I believe that an Irn Bru can is orange, beliefs are typically 
quite distinct from perceptions. Beliefs are non-sensory in a way that perceptions are 
inherently sensory. Also, beliefs don’t generally seem to change perceptions. For example, 
as a perceptual theorist, I know what is illusory about many instances of perceptual 
illusions, yet that knowledge and the associated beliefs don’t prevent me from being 
susceptible to the perceptual effects the illusions generate.  
If perception and belief are inadequate to explain memory colour effects, perhaps 
imagination can help. Imaginings are typically sensory in a way that beliefs aren’t, so 
imagination is a candidate to explain the sensory aspect of memory colour effects. On 
Macpherson’s proposal24, an Irn Bru can is experienced as more orange than the orange 
cube because you believe that an Irn Bru can is orange (a cognitive state), and that triggers 
an imaginative state of orangeness that is injected into the occurrent perception of an Irn 
Bru can. Nothing of this sort happens regarding your perception of the orange cube. As a 
result, an Irn Bru can is experienced as being an overly saturated orange. The proposal is 
controversial, but assuming memory colour effects occur, some kind of explanation is 
demanded, and postulating perceptual states that are infused or injected with imaginings is 
an intriguing proposal.  
																																								 																				 	
24 F. Macpherson, Novel Colour Experiences and their Implications, cit. 
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Memory colour effects are just one kind of case that falls under the label “cognitive 
penetration of perception”, and cognitive penetration cases are just one kind of case that 
might benefit from postulating states that are a mixture of perceptual and imaginative 
elements. The clarity and forcefulness of the colour case proves immensely valuable for 
these issues, and the increased attention these issues are receiving seems well deserved. 
 
5. Colour and the predictive mind 
The predictive coding approach to perception and the mind more generally is a very 
active research area at the moment25. However, while colour perception is an extremely 
well-studied facet of our minds, the ways in which colour perception might inform or be 
informed by predictive coding are largely unexplored. Let me situate the core issues. 
Bayesian approaches to the mind utilize Bayesian probability theory, and in particular 
Bayes’s Theorem, to understand mental processing. In its most general and rough form, 
Bayes’s Theorem describes an event’s probability by reference to conditions or priors that 
are assumed to obtain before the event. It is routinely applied to perceptual processing, and 
in some cases to colour perception. With regard to colour, the starting assumption is usually 
that a core function of colour vision is to represent the light reflectances of surfaces in one’s 
environment. However, the light entering in the eye doesn’t directly provide this 
information but is instead ambiguous between various combinations of reflectances and 
conditions of illuminations (and perhaps other factors like light transmission features of 
media). This ambiguity in sensory information is a classic example of the “inverse optics” 
problem in perception. Over the last several decades, various models of colour constancy 
have proposed assumptions that visual systems do or might make to overcome this 
problem. Some of these have now been re-cast in terms of Bayesianism26. In addition, some 
projects in colour science are more generally built around Bayesianism27.  
																																								 																				 	
25 A. Clark, Whatever Next? Predictive brains, situated agents and the future of cognitive science, in 
“Behavioural and Brain Sciences”, 36 (3), 2013, pp. 181-253; J. Hohwy, The Predictive Mind, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2013. 
26 E.g. D. H. Brainard, Bayesian Approaches to Color Vision, in M. S. Gazzaniga, E. Bizzi, L. M. Chalupa, S. 
T. Grafton, T. F. Heatherton, C. Koch, J. E. LeDoux, S. J. Luck, G. R. Mangan, J. A. Movshon, H. Neville, E. 
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Predictive coding is a sophisticated approach to mental processing, but here are the key 
ideas for our purposes. The prior assumptions of a perceptual system don’t merely serve to 
disambiguate sensory information (e.g. light reaching the eye) but are more substantively 
used to generate a model of what is perceptually available before a subject. The model is 
then checked for accuracy against incoming sensory information and updated as needed. 
This is a significant departure from classical 28  (e.g. Marrian) models of perceptual 
computation. On classical models, a perceptual system builds a model of what is before the 
subject by performing various computations on incoming sensory information, 
computations that utilize stored assumptions and algorithms. Thus, on a classical picture, 
perceptual models are primarily built around incoming sensory information. On the 
predictive coding picture perceptual models are primarily built using stored assumptions, 
and then adjusted against incoming sensory information as needed.  
There are numerous questions about how to develop the predictive coding approach, and 
various challenges are being posed. Colour vision is an obvious case study to examine this 
project, but at present little to no work has been done to this end. The following kinds of 
questions are worth examining. How straightforward is it to apply the Bayesian approaches 
to colour vision to predictive coding? How is the self-generated perceptual model of 
predictive coding to be understood in the context of colour vision, and what evidence is 
there for its existence? Some models of colour perception do not assume that a core 
function of colour vision is to represent the light reflectances of surfaces in one’s 
environment29. How are these models expressible with Bayesianism and within predictive 
coding? There are also open questions about how to understand perceptual representation 
and perceptual experience within predictive coding. Colour is a natural case study for these 
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																										
A. Phelps, P. Rakic, D. L. Schacter, M. Sur, B. A. Wandell (eds.), The cognitive neurosciences, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge Ma. 2009, pp. 395–408. 
27 E.g. S. Allred, Approaching Color with Bayesian Algorithms, in S. Allred, G. Hatfield (eds.), Visual 
Experience: Sensation, Cognition and Constancy, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012, pp. 212-231.		
	
29 E.g. D. Foster, Does colour constancy exist?, in “TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences”, 7(10), 2003, pp. 439-
443. 
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questions. Unfortunately, the topic of the predictive mind isn’t discussed in depth in the 
Handbook. It strikes me as worthy of future research30. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The above broad issues – colour and metaphilosophy (§1), colour and artistic practice (§2), 
colour and virtual/augmented reality (§3), colour and imagination (§4), and colour and the 
predictive mind (§5) – all strike me as areas ripe for current research. In many instances the 
Handbook only scratches the surface of these topics. To be sure, the many topics that the 
Handbook does delve deeply into are also ripe for current research. This is just to say that 
the philosophy of colour, as strong as it has been in recent decades, shows no signs of 
letting up.31 
 
																																								 																				 	
30 I should note that I currently have a doctoral student, Steven Broadrick, whose thesis is on predictive 
coding and colour. I am indebted to him for helping me appreciate the underexplored opportunities in this 
domain. 
31 Thank you to Fiona Macpherson and two anonymous referees for helpful feedback on this paper. 
